Geo-mutualist panarchism is the view that everyone should share in the surplus of the Earth, that everyone has a right to credit that is equal to, consistent with, and backed by the value of their collateral or good-will, and that markets should operate within a well-structured system of henocentric law, which will provide the subject-matter of this piece.
Panarchism is a natural-law view of jurisprudence given to us by Paul Emile de Puydt, a botanist and political economist. Displaying his natural law tendencies, de Puydt suggests that,
Although nothing is perfect in human endeavours, at least things move towards a never attainable perfection: that is the law of progress. The laws of nature alone are immutable; all legislation must be based on them, for they alone have the strength to support the structure of society; but the structure itself is the work of mankind.”[i]
Likely due to his views as a botanist, but also as a radical libertarian, Paul envisioned a world wherein people were free to choose the government, or non-government, of their choice. This reflects, in many ways, the laws of natural selection and market-choice. The only thing tying units together would be a civil registry office, wherein one may declare themselves a citizen of one or more governments or free institutions. He says,
My panacea, if you will allow this term, is simply free competition in the business of government. Everyone has the right to look after his own welfare as he sees it and to obtain security under his own conditions. On the other hand, this means progress through contest between governments forced to compete for followers. True worldwide liberty is that which is not forced upon anyone, being to each just what he wants of it; it neither suppresses nor deceives, and is always subject to a right of appeal. To bring about such a liberty, there would be no need to give up either national traditions or family ties, no need to learn to think in a new language, no need at all to cross rivers or seas, carrying the bones of one’s ancestors.
It is simply a matter of declaration before one’s local political commission, for one to move from republic to monarchy, from representative government to autocracy, from oligarchy to democracy, or even to Mr. Proudhon’s anarchy – without even the necessity of removing one’s dressing gown or slippers.[ii]
Often, when hearing about a radical and new system, a listener will ask, “How will this solve x?” completely disregarding the fact that x has not been resolved under the current regime. Anarchists, for instance, are asked constantly, “How would crime be solved?” as if crime is not an issue in current society, due to the courtesy and benevolence of involuntary government! De Puydt accepts the challenge of resolving disputes among governments with competing jurisdictions, pointing to the fact that governments, as they exist today, have disputes that must be resolved, and manners of resolving them, oftentimes without the need for force:
If a disagreement came about between subjects of different governments, or between one government and a subject of another, it would simply be a matter of observing the principles hitherto observed between neighbouring peaceful States; and if a gap were found, it could be filled without difficulties by human rights and all other possible rights. Anything else would be the business of ordinary courts of justice. [iii]
De Puydt, despite what may be inferred by the idea, does not discount the idea that society needs to operate on a larger scale at times. He understands that
There might and should be also common interests affecting all inhabitants of a certain district, no matter what their political allegiance is. Each government, in this case, would stand in relation to the whole nation roughly as each of the Swiss cantons, or better, the States of the American Union, stand in relation to their federal government. Thus, all these fundamental and seemingly frightening questions are met with ready-made solutions; jurisdiction is established over most issues and would present no difficulties whatsoever.
Certainly it will happen that some malicious spirits, incorrigible dreamers and unsociable natures, will not accommodate themselves to any known form of government. Also there will be minorities too weak to cover the costs of their ideal States.
So much the worse for them. These odd few are free to propagate their ideas and to recruit up to their full complement, or rather, up to the needs of their budget, for everything would resolve into a matter of finance. Until then they will have to opt for one of the established forms of government. It is assumed that such small minorities will not cause any trouble. [iv]
In many ways, de Puydt’s system does for the institution of the state what free elections and limited terms did for the institution of democratic government (here to be defined as such: the state is the apparatus, and the government the people who work it; this is not a distinction I always use). Elections and limited term-lengths ensured that no one held governmental power to wield the state for too long. This is akin to a perpetual revolution, a perpetual overthrow of the monarchy. Likewise, de Puydt’s system ensures that “states” (as he sees them, but not as I define them in “Complete Anarchy”) come and go as they are found necessary by their participants, a perpetual revolution of the very structure of “the state.” It is hard to declare such an institution a state at this point, as it no longer holds an exclusive monopoly within a geographic region. Its participants are free to join any institution they would like.
Panarchy, for myself— otherwise an anarchist—, came with the realization that many of the institutions to which anarchists are opposed are often ferociously defended by their constituents. These constituents are already living in anarchy, at least in the voluntaryist sense of the term (which I accept, but am not limited to). They voluntarily participate in, and defend, the structures that anarchists find oppressive. It is the anarchist, who must live under the will of this majority, who is not living in anarchy, because it is the anarchists who find themselves in discontent with the way of the day, and would prefer something different. For me, panarchism correlated to the realization that anarchy, as I understand it—in an egoist and voluntaryist sense—, already exists today for many people, though it is not at all my preferred version of anarchy, and although it does not include me in its realm. The state is anarchy for those who accept it. This anarchy of others is the government I wish to rid myself of.
Ridding myself of involuntary governance does not suggest that I have the desire to abolish the governments to which others subscribe, but to grow my anarchy alongside the anarchy of others, which I, and others who consider themselves anarchists, today consider government (because it lacks our consent and demands our membership). Panarchy offers the solution to the problem, by providing the common grounds between anarchists and governmentalists. Paul Emile de Puydt suggests that
What is most admirable about this innovation is that it does away, forever, with revolutions, mutinies, and street fighting, down to the last tensions in the political tissue. Are you dissatisfied with your government? Change over to another! These four words, always associated with horror and bloodshed, words which all courts, high and low, military and special, without exception, unanimously find guilty of inciting to rebellion, these four words become innocent, as if in the mouths of seminarists, and as harmless as the medicine so wrongly mistrusted by Mr. de Pourceaugnac.
“Change over to another” means: Go to the Bureau for Political Membership, cap in hand, and ask politely for your name to be transferred to any list you please. The Commissioner will put on his glasses, open the register, enter your decision, and give you a receipt. You take your leave, and the revolution is accomplished without spilling any more than a drop of ink. [v]
Paul’s system offers a comforting approach to libertarian politics, which is considerate of cultural differences and actually-existing priorities. These priorities, if we admit the truth, do not always seem rational to us as anarchits. People make decisions for themselves that we would never make for ourselves. If anarchism includes the right to be wrong, but not to enforce one’s opinions onto others, anarchism includes the right of voluntary emergence. It cannot be forced. As de Puydt suggests, “Freedom should even extend to the right not to be free, and should include it.”[vi]
While de Puydt’s retort regarding conflict between institutions—that “it would simply be a matter of observing the principles hitherto observed between neighbouring peaceful States; and if a gap were found, it could be filled without difficulties by human rights and all other possible rights” [vii]—actually provides an argument quite strong, it does not necessarily consider the problems that exist between governments when they are not in times of peace.
Many of the conflicts that exist between governments are enabled and driven by the desire for more resources. This is true of most human conflicts, which are greatly rooted in economic conditions. Economics, after all, is the study of people’s choices regarding scarce resources with infinite wants. Most human conflicts come down to some of these wants going unsatisfied. Michael Tomasello, for instance—a lead researcher at the Max Planck Institute’s anthropology and behavioral psychology studies— lends himself toward a strong argument that humans are instinctually pre-determined to concern themselves with matters of fairness. He says that in a
study in our laboratory […] a subject is given an amount of real money, say 100 euros, and is told that she should offer some to an unknown partner. This partner, who knows how much has been given to the subject, may then accept the offer, in which case both partners take their shares and go home. Or the partner may reject the offer, and no one gets anything. There are some cultural variations in the way humans react, but by far the most common reaction by partners in this game is to reject low offers, less than about 30 euros. The logic of rational maximizing would say, “Take the 25 euros, because, even if that guy is a jerk, 25 is better than none.” But people do not do this; they reject low offers because, as subjects report, they are not fair. Proposers anticipate this, by the way, and so typically offer an even split.[viii]
When people feel they are “getting the short end of the stick” they are more likely to act out in antisocial manners. Geo-mutualist panarchism is the realization within panarchism that violent conflicts between existing governments are greatly related to property distribution and concerns of fairness.
While de Puydt’s project is noble and honest, it lacks in practical clarity. Is the matter of property not a matter of sovereignty, today secured by government? With communist, socialist, capitalist, fascist, and other kinds of views on property, what is to keep one government from infringing on the government of others? What is to keep the strong governments from ignoring the declarations of the weak? To de Puydt, the solution seems rather open. He does offer a structure similar to a voluntary confederation, but he speaks nothing of the institutions of property and credit.
While I am a proponent of natural selection, and believe in the power of supply and demand to allocate labor and resources in the most efficient manner, I do believe natural selection and the law of supply and demand to be the very reason institutions exist. That is, there is a demand for institutions, and this demand provides the conditions of their positive selection. While the process view is correct—that nothing is, or should be thought of as, permanent—I feel it to be unpragmatic to ignore things as they occur to us in the seemingly present moment. These things I speak of are not restricted to material things, but also mental constructs, such as norms regarding property rights. De Puydt ignores the necessity of a positive theory of property to regulate conflict between institutions in his panarchy.
It is my belief—taking after my mutualist and Georgist forebears— that conflict-resolution must be tied to the distribution of wealth. The anarcho-capitalist, in the form of strict voluntaryism, does quite well at describing voluntary interaction in the market, but is quick to assume that property in land and in natural monopoly should be a perpetual and private affair, or something to be ignored. The anarcho-communists quickly resolve this issue by putting the entire economy into the hands of a workers’ federation, declaring distribution according to need. This does well in regard to resolving disputes over management and claims to land, but anarcho-communism places the laborer’s effort and their product under the terms of the community as well. This lack of autonomy creates a great deal of resentment. De Puydt acknowledges the role of resentment in today’s politics, though he does not propose an economic— but a political— solution:
Under the present conditions a government exists only by the exclusion of all the others, and one party can rule only after smashing its opponents; a majority is always harassed by a minority which is impatient to govern. Under such conditions it is quite inevitable that the parties hate each other and live, if not at war, at least in a state of armed peace. Who is surprised to see that minorities intrigue and agitate, and that governments put down by force any aspiration to a different political form which would be similarly exclusive? So society ends up composed of ambitious resentful men, waiting for vengeance, and ambitious power-sated men, sitting complacently on the edge of a precipice. Erroneous principles never bring about just consequences, and coercion never leads to right or truth. [ix]
De Puydt’s vision of a free society is quite beautiful, but I fear that it is impractical without a uniform system of wealth-distribution that satisfies everyone involved. As long as people do not feel they are getting their fair share, there will exist violence between interested parties. Equilibrium will not be established. Geo-mutualism, I believe, provides the best solution, as it allows the price of land and credit to settle into equilibrium, ridding society of the two monopolies which most hinder its happiness.
Benjamin Tucker, like Proudhon and other mutualist and individualist anarchists, considered the monopolies on land and credit to be particularly damaging. He says, “Somebody gets the surplus wealth that labor produces and does not consume.”
And where do the Somebodies get their power? From monopoly. Here, as usual, the State is the chief of sinners. Usury rests on two great monopolies; the monopoly of land and the monopoly of credit. Were it not for these, it would disappear. Ground-rent exists only because the State stands by to collect it and to protect land-titles rooted in force or fraud. Otherwise the land would be free to all, and no one could control more than he used. Interest and house-rent exist only because the State grants to a certain class of individuals and corporations the exclusive privilege of using its credit and theirs as a basis for the issuance of circulating currency. Otherwise credit would be free to all, and money, brought under the law of competition, would be issued at cost. Interest and rent gone, competition would leave little or no chance for profit in exchange except in business protected by tariff or patent laws. And there again the State has but to step aside to cause the last vestige of usury to disappear.
The usurer is the Somebody, and the State is his protector.[x]
This is not a scenario that exists only within governments, but also between them. Some states find themselves the victims of others. I suppose de Puydt imagines that each government or institution will have the means to create their own systems of property, but if property is to exist on a scale in which governments support and respect one another’s declaration of property-rights, this entails an overarching system of contract. It is easy to suggest that we can take care of problems similarly to the manner in which nation-states today take care of problems between their borders, but it is rare that we see non-imperialist satellite states, colonies, or territories. Instead, we see grouping, and monocentric law. The solution must be much more similar to the manner in which property rights and private security are dealt with under a state. Property rights are protected by lawsuit, and suits depend on higher levels of association, even if not a state. If we are looking toward a system of polycentric law, this is dependent firstly on a participatory and consensual system of monocentric law. The combination of the two (mono- and polycentric law) is my proposed henocentric law.
When confronted with a comment from an imaginary reader (below in bold) about the evolution toward a single system, de Puydt replies that he feels it is unlikely, but that it is not completely out of the picture:
When all possible types of government have been tried everywhere publicly and under free competition, what will be the result? One form is sure to be recognised as the best, and thus finally everyone will choose it. This would lead us back to having one government for all, which is just where we began.
Not so fast please, dear reader.
You freely admit that all would then be in harmony, and you call this going back to where we began? Your objection gives support to my fundamental principle, in so far as it expects this universal agreement to be established by the simple expedient of “laissez-faire, laissez-passer.”
I could seize this opportunity to declare you convinced, converted to my system, but I am not interested in half-convictions and I am not looking for converts.
No, we would not revert to having a single form of government, unless perhaps in the far distant future when governmental activities will be reduced by common consent to the simplest form. We are not there yet, not anywhere near it.[xi]
In many ways, though, de Puydt’s system of panarchy under registry offices is a proposal for such a singular, but dynamic, system. While it may be true that de Puydt supports competing offices, in order for them to really take effect without conflict they must establish common agreements between them. Afterall, what is to stop a registry office from signing members up to governments without their consent, as telemarketers do with phone lists? All that would be needed is a little theft of identity information. I suppose the legitimate institution can offer up some sort of empirical proof—signatures, photos, documents, etc.—, but to whom will they be showing these documents for protection? God? “God helps those who help themselves.” There is an obvious need for association and agreement to common terms of title.
Conflict and Resolution
It is the nature of conflict-resolution that it promotes higher and higher levels of association. Association promotes understanding, the creation of norms and ground rules, which preempt conflict before it happens.
According to some models of social evolution, conflict comes with a choice of behavior: avoidance, accommodation, control, compromise, or collaboration. That is, one can avoid another, can do as they wish (against their own will), can dominate them, can allow for individual space or decisions, or can share that in space and those decisions. Likewise, evolutionary models based in game-theory suggest that there are four possible choices for inter-organismic behavior: spite, altruism, narcissism, and reciprocity. The models suggest that spite is the least successful, because it is most detrimental to both parties; altruism is very unsuccessful because it allows for being taken advantage of; narcissism allows the strong to preserve themselves at the expense of others, but also allows damage to occur in conflict; but that reciprocity or mutualism is the most successful because it creates a win-win situation. We can, in my opinion, pair these two models in this way: avoidance and spite (both are degrees of lose-lose behavior); accommodation and altruism; control and narcissism; and compromise and collaboration together as degrees of reciprocity (or mutualism). In many ways, mutualism is teleologically pre-determined.
It is the nature of conflict that a community steps in to resolve issues. The loss of a group-member is also a loss for the group. Bruce L. Benson, a legal and economic scholar on matters of free-market law, suggests that
Should a dispute arise [under customary law, without the state], reciprocal support groups give individuals a position of strength. This does not necessarily mean, however, that disputes are settled by warfare between groups. Violence is a costly means of solving a dispute: if the accuser and his support group attack the accused, the accused’s group is obliged to defend the attack. Consequently, arrangements and procedures for non-violent dispute resolution should evolve very quickly in customary law systems.[xii]
Bruce L. Benson suggests that customary, common, commercial, and contract-based systems of law—that is, popular forms of law that don’t depend on the state— generally center around concepts of possession and compensation for offenses. He suggests that behaviors are generally unregulated, except so far as they constitute actual offenses against a person or their possessions. If a person harms another person, or their property, the community settles the matter by making the offender compensate the victim. Benson goes on to suggest that customary law—which is simply law reinforced by norms and customs of a specific group—evolved into common law, a system of codes regarding offenses and their treatments. Criminal law, according to Benson, was introduced by the Norman invasion, and included laws regarding behavior, rather than simply covering offenses and suits. It also evolved away from compensation of victims to fines paid to government. This was a negative and authoritarian application of law. With the rise of commercial society, commercial law started to fill the gaps left by governments. Bruce L. Benson suggests further that
[…] as the norms of commercial law became more precisely specified, they were increasingly recorded. These written laws were not in the form of statutory codes (although many governments ultimately adopted privately created mercantile law in the commercial legislation), but took the form of written commercial instruments and contracts.[xiii]
It is clear that human systems of law develop as means for communities to better resolve disputes among their members.
Community dispute resolution, of course, must be accompanied by group decision-making processes. As an anarchist, I am quite drawn to consensus-based decision-making. C.T. Butler, author of On Conflict & Consensus,and an instructor on the formal decision-making process, suggests that conflict is often a necessary element which precedes consensus:
Conflict is usually viewed as an impediment to reaching agreements and disruptive to peaceful relationships. However, it is the underlying thesis of Formal Consensus that nonviolent conflict is necessary and desirable. It provides the motivations for improvement. The challenge is the creation of an understanding in all who participate that conflict, or differing opinions about proposals, is to be expected and acceptable. Do not avoid or repress conflict. Create an environment in which disagreement can be expressed without fear. Objections and criticisms can be heard not as attacks, not as attempts to defeat a proposal, but as a concern which, when resolved, will make the proposal stronger.
This understanding of conflict may not be easily accepted by the members of a group. Our training by society undermines this concept. Therefore, it will not be easy to create the kind of environment where differences can be expressed without fear or resentment. But it can be done. It will require tolerance and a willingness to experiment. Additionally, the values and principles which form the basis of commitment to work together to resolve conflict need to be clearly defined, and accepted by all involved.
If a group desires to adopt Formal Consensus as its decisionmaking process, the first step is the creation of a Statement of Purpose or Constitution. This document would describe not only the common purpose, but would also include the definition of the group’s principles and values. If the group discusses and writes down its foundation of principles at the start, it is much easier to determine group versus individual concerns later on.[xiv]
There is need for a reciprocal contract or constitution, which empowers a common registry office, and allocates land and credit in a manner that balances conflict. This contract should “be reduced by common consent to the simplest form.”[xv]
Governments are powerless without a sovereign claim to a piece of the Earth, without an area over which they may claim sovereignty. In order for people to establish the governments or institutions of their choice, it is necessary to provide them with an area over which they may express sovereignty. In order to prevent imperialism, it is necessary to distribute economic rent in a manner that enriches everyone equally.
A geo-mutual panarchist confederation would act simultaneously as a provider of credit, a community land trust, a citizen registry system, and a provider of reciprocal defense. Upon joining such an institution, one would be issued credit backed by their collateral or good-will; given the opportunity to bid on land with their credit and/or to receive a dividend for forfeiting the best land; and/or given the opportunity to register with a subsidiary unit, which will provide these services in a manner more consistent with their values. One would also agree to participate in the reciprocal reinforcement of the laws. One can join directly to the geo-mutual bank as an individualist, declare themselves sovereign, and have the means to make exchanges and the territory over which to act as a sovereign; or they can, more collectivistically, join a subsidiary association, which has such a deal itself, but manages it in another manner, perhaps according to the principle of “from each according to ability, to each according to need,” or some similar axiom from the other end of the spectrum (or anywhere within it, really). This being the case, the only role of the geo-mutual bank is to register sovereigns; provide the sovereigns an equal value of territory over which to express their sovereignty; to issue a common means of credit, with which sovereigns may freely make exchanges and settle disputes; and provide a common contract with which to settle disputes among sovereigns. After this, the sovereigns should be free to express their sovereignty, whether it be alone or in groups. This brings us to the practice of henocentric law.
My vision for henocentric law has elements of a collaborative and consent-based monocentric law, which plays the sole purpose of decentralizing sovereignty; accompanied by the practice of decentralized sovereignty, as expressed in polycentric systems of law and order. That is, a polycentric system that operates in the general framework of a monocentric system.
Allow me to explain mono- and polycentric systems of law, in order that the distinction can be made a little clearer. Monocentric law refers to a system under which everyone is subject. A monocentric system of law is a system that applies to everyone within a given territory. The law provided by the United States Federal Government, or instance, is a monocentric system of law, because all citizens must obey it (at least in theory). A polycentric system, however, allows for the overlapping of jurisdictions, and the provision of law on a subscriber-basis. A good example of polycentric law can be found in the manner in which churches operate. While a certain church may receive membership within a certain area, this same area can be filled with members of other religious institutions, or completely areligious folks, all following different codes of behavior and rules of their religion on their own property. If an atheist is invited into the home of a Christian, it is generally with the understanding that certain attitudes must be forfeited while in such a domain. While the atheist has the right to display upside-down crosses in their own home, and within their own associations, for instance, this behavior generally stops once they enter the property of the Christian, as a matter of respect of sovereignty. Tom Bell, a proponent of polycentric law, suggests that
The very definition of polycentric law implies that individuals choose the sort of law under which they prefer to live. In a broad sense, then, all legal issues in a polycentric legal order would boil down to the law of contracts. In a narrower sense, however, competing legal systems would offer substantively different means of resolving disputes over property, torts, business agreements, etc. A wide variety of communities should therefore develop, sometimes overlapping and sometimes separate, each offering its own unique sets of laws.[xvi]
Henocentric law, as I have named it, is given its moniker after the theological framework of henotheism. In a system of henotheism, one God is often worshipped as supreme, while others are also acknowledged to exist. The Greek pantheon, for instance, was headed by the supreme deity, Zeus, who ruled over the other gods. In Hindu cosmology, a pantheistic form of henotheism, Brahman provides the grounds of all being, and all other gods are expressed within Brahman. Similarly, my system of henocentric law would recognize the “political all,” the panarchy, as sovereign, but would allocate all affairs of management to subsidiary units. As henotheism is a mixture of monotheism and polytheism, henocentric law is the mixture of monocentric and polycentric systems of law.
In order for conflict to be pre-empted, and in order for property distribution to settle into equilibrium, it is necessary to live under a common system of property and exchange. This common system of property and exchange, if it is to do its duty—to provide fairness and justice—, will administer property and credit to allow for all economically viable and voluntary forms of sovereignty. The purpose of the monocentric system of wealth allocation will be to allow for polycentric law to take place. My vision of henocentric law is a dynamic system in which a participatory monocentric law provides the grounds upon which polycentric law may be established.
While polycentric law is a dynamic vision, allowing for the maximum practice of human preferences, the idea of polycentric law becomes complicated by the nature of geography. The reason we don’t have polycentric systems of law today is largely due to the fact that the surplus of the Earth has been monopolized. Those communities who monopolized the surplus value of the land dominated the others, and established themselves as states. This is the very reason we don’t have polycentric law as proposed by folks like Gustav Molinari or Tom Bell. In order for polycentric law and free exchange markets to be practiced, wealth must be distributed, the rent of the Earth must be held in common. Otherwise, unilateral and non-participatory monopolies will form, as they have in the past (giving us states). Geo-mutualist panarchism is the realization that, in order for panarchy to function, the economy must be set straight. This is done by issuing free credit and leasing the land on a basis of rent-sharing.
Henocentric order is made necessary by the external facts of geography and the economic rent that some land provides as benefits over others. If the Earth and its value was less complicated, and easier to distribute fairly according to homestead, and if natural monopolies were nonexistent, polycentric law would be all that is necessary. However, because justice finds itself to be a matter of natural monopoly, a community affair, and because the Earth varies so greatly in human-derived value, a common understanding, a consensus, is in order. Lacking such a consensus, humanity is left in a state of conflict, bickering over land, and enforcing their opinions with blades, bullets, and rockets.
Geo-mutualism is an economic view which proposes that humanity has a positive right to the use of the Earth and a negative right in the application of their labor. In other words, geo-mutualism proposes that everyone should have a basically unrestricted right to decide where their labor goes, and should have a right to an equal share of the Earth on which to subsist. This being so, geo-mutualism best supports the notion that labor should operate according to polycentrism, and property should be issued according to monocentric practice. That is, plots of the Earth should be allocated by the community as a whole, according to common agreement, but labor on those plots should be left to the management and voluntary exchange of the individual. A geo-mutual panarchist confederation would allocate land, issue credit, register participants, and preserve law and order between constituents. What is done with land once it is leased, with credit once it is issued, is a matter of choice on behalf of the holder. This practice, henocentric law, surpasses and contains both monocentric and polycentric systems of law.
For further studies:
On how decision-making in a geo-mutual panarchist confederation would operate: “Direct-, Participatory, and Consensus-Democracy: A Geo-Mutual Panarchist Affirmation of Positive Decision-Making Methods”
On how geo-mutual panarchism constitutes a truly and classically anarchist society: “Complete Anarchy: A Geo-Mutualist Definition of the State”
On how land and credit would operate: See the essays in my book, The Evolution of Consent: Collected Essays, relating to credit and land, including “Mutual Credit: Its Function and Purpose,” “Credit, Collateral, and Spot-Pricing,” “The Proper Rate of Money,” “Interest and Premium: A Geo-Mutualist Synthesis,” and “Cost, Aggression, and Access to the Land.”
[i] Paul Emile de Puydt, “Panarchy.” Accessed October 29, 2014: http://www.panarchy.org/depuydt/1860.eng.html
[viii] Michael Tomasello, Why We Cooperate (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 32.
[ix] Paul Emile de Puydt
[x] Benjamin Tucker, edited by Clarence Lee Swartz, “Capital, Profits, and Interest,” Individual Liberty (New York: Revisionist Press, 1926), 88.
[xi] Paul Emile de Puydt
[xii] Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law (San Francisco: The Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), 14.
[xiii] Ibid., 32.
[xiv] C.T. Butler, On Conflict and Consensus (Food Not Bombs, 1991), 21.
[xv] Paul Emile de Puydt
[xvi] Tom W. Bell, “The Jurisprudence of Polycentric Law” (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992) Accessed October 29, 2014: http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/JurisPoly.html